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Abstract The relationship between individual and popu-
lationhealthispartiallybuiltonthebroaddichotomizationof
medicine into clinical medicine and public health. Potential
drawbacks of current views include seeing both individual
andpopulationhealthasabsoluteand independentconcepts.
I will argue that the relationship between individual and
population health is largely relative and dynamic. Their
interrelated dynamism derives from a causally deﬁned life
course perspective on health determination starting from an
individual’s conception through growth, development and
participation in the collective till death, all seen within the
context of an adaptive society. Indeed, it will become clear
thatneitherindividualnorpopulationhealthisidentiﬁableor
even deﬁnable without informative contextualization within
the other. For instance, a person’s health cannot be seen in
isolation but must be placed in the rich contextual web such
as the socioeconomic circumstances and other health deter-
minants of where they were conceived, born, bred, and how
they shaped and were shaped by their environment and
communities, especially given the prevailing population
health exposures over their lifetime. We cannot discuss the
‘‘what’’and‘‘howmuch’’ofindividualandpopulationhealth
until we know the cumulative trajectories of both, using
appropriate causal language.
Keywords Causality  Context  Ethics  Individual
health  Life course  Population health  Theory of health
Introduction
‘‘Population health’’ is a relatively new, rather fashionable
term in the medical ﬁeld.
1 From its probable origins in
Canada to its current use in the literature (Kindig and
Stoddart 2003; Arah and Westert 2005), population health
calls up images of non-individual health, at least in its
literal meaning. Unsurprisingly, there is also ‘‘individual
health’’ which is often seen as the complement of popu-
lation health. Is population health merely the opposite of
individual health? Do both represent core descriptions of
health with respect to the individuals and societies? Both
forms of health are, however, rarely analyzed together in
the same papers,
2 probably due to the prevailing dichotomy
of medicine into clinical medicine (with its personal or
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1 A quick search of PubMed, the main literature indexing system in
medicine, reveals that the term ‘‘population health’’ was used in the
titles of 21, 27, 66, and 429 articles in the periods 1967–1976, 1977–
1986, 1987–1996, and 1997–2006, respectively. This represents a 20-
fold increase from the 1967–1976 to the 1997–2006 periods. In
contrast, the use of the term ‘‘individual health’’ or ‘‘personal health’’
in titles of article increased by only 9- or 3-fold, respectively, in the
same period. Likewise, the use of ‘‘public health’’ barely doubled in
that period.
2 This is, of course, only valid if we take both terms to refer to forms,
types or states of health. As we will see later, population health, for
instance, has been described as being more than just a summary term
for the health of populations. In fact, population health has been
called a ﬁeld of study, perhaps to mirror the observation that the
rather well-developed sister ﬁeld, clinical medicine, deals with
individual health (Kindig and Stoddart 2003; Coburn et al. 2003;
Mechanic 2003; Pana and Muzzi 2004; Friedman and Starﬁeld 2003).
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ebrated public or collective,
3 and thus, population health
purview) (Jamrozik and Hobbs 2002; Arah 2005; Arah
et al. 2006). This binary approach to health and medicine
has also played an important role in differentiating public
health from personal medical care (Acheson 1988; Arah
2009; Arah et al. 2006; Verweij and Dawson 2007).
Arguably, the birth of public health ethics as distinguish-
able from clinical ethics also rests on this dichotomization
of medicine (see (Beauchamp 1975, 1983; Dawson and
Verweij 2007). This dichotomization could even be traced
back to the polarizing approaches of individualism and
collectivism in the social sciences (O’Neill 1973; Weale
1981; Ball 2001). This if-it’s-not-individual-it’s-collective
approach begs the question if that is all there is to a pos-
sible relationship between individual health and population
health. Is it possible to study the relationship between
individual and population health entirely in terms of the
individual or the collective? And if at all, could the same
concept of health be easily mapped onto the population
level as at the individual level?
This article will argue that neither individual nor pop-
ulation health is identiﬁable or even deﬁnable without
informative contextualization within the other. For
instance, a person’s health cannot be seen only in isolation
but must be placed in the rich contextual web such as the
socioeconomic circumstances and other health determi-
nants of where they were conceived, born, bred, and how
they shaped and were shaped by their environment and
communities, especially given the prevailing population
health exposures over their lifetime. We cannot discuss the
‘‘what’’ and ‘‘how much’’ of individual and population
health until we know the cumulative trajectories of both,
using appropriate causal language. Indeed, the comple-
mentary relationship between individual and population
health evokes important socially relevant causal inferences
about both having the duality of being determinants and
outcomes over time, and within and between places or
societies. The causal interpretations accorded both types of
health ﬂow directly from and are foundational to their
deﬁnitional and measurement concerns.
Lonely lives: from the concept and collective context of
health to individual health
Health as a concept is the focus of heated debates in the
philosophy and medical literature.
4 This literature is
overwhelmingly concerned with the health of the individ-
ual and the medical or healthcare interpretations and
interventions at the level of the diseased individual. In
those instances, the term healthcare is often used to imply
both personal medical care and public health.
5 Currently,
there are at least two major schools of thought on the
concept of health, namely, the naturalist and the norma-
tivist theories of health (Boorse 1975, 1977, 1997;
Schramme 2007; Nordenfelt 1986, 1995, 2007). Within the
normativist theory, there are weak and strong normativist
views (Khushf 2007).
The naturalist theory of health, which claims to be
descriptive, value-free and consistent with evolutionary
theory, states that an individual is completely healthy if and
only if all her organs function normally, that is, given a
statistically normal environment, her organs make at least
their statistically normal contribution to her survival or to
the human species survival (Boorse 1977, 1997; Schramme
2007). Thus, a healthy person is easily identiﬁed through
objective medical investigation. According to normativist
criticisms (Nordenfelt 2007), the naturalist theory of health
lays too much emphasis on internal processes, biology and
the absence of disease, effectively excluding extrabiologi-
cal considerations such as ‘‘person,’’ ‘‘intentional action’’
and ‘‘cultural standards.’’ On the other hand, the norma-
tivist account, which espouses a value-laden evaluative
approach holds that an individual is completely healthy if
and only if she has the ability, given standard circum-
stances, to reach all her vital or essential goals in life
(Nordenfelt 2007). This latter theory depicts a continuum
where health accommodates disease, takes a holistic con-
textual approach, and instrumentalizes health in the larger
scheme of vital life goals.
Interestingly both theories of health, to some extent, see
disease in terms of relevant organ dysfunction. For
instance, according to the naturalist account, a person has a
disease if and only if at least one of her organs functions
subnormally, given a statistically normal environment,
3 I use ‘‘collective’’ to refer to a deﬁnable group of people who share
or are motivated by at least one common interest or work together to
achieve a common objective. ‘‘Collective’’ may give an objectionable
sense of an aggregation, yet it has a powerful way of reminding us
that every society or collective is made up of individuals who are
bound in a rich tapestry (Arah 2009).
4 See the March 2007 issue of the journal Medicine, Health Care and
Philosophy for illuminating discussions of the concept of health.
5 As argued elsewhere (Verweij and Dawson 2007; Arah 2005, 2009;
Arah et al. 2006), (personal) medical care is best used to connote the
more individually oriented healthcare services, usually involving one-
on-one patient–physician interactions, whereas public health—in
addition to its health of the public or population health meaning—is
perhaps best described as the organized efforts aimed at collective
mechanisms of ensuring the health of the collective or the healthful
context for the interacting individuals within the collective.
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123while the normativist theory asserts that a disease is a state
or process in which the individual has at least one organ
involved in any state that tends to reduce the individual’s
health. Although engaging in a debate on the merits of each
theory of health is beyond the scope of this article, I want
to point out that both theories appear to take the context or
circumstances or environment of any health-disease con-
tinuum as merely observed or passive, not active,
interventional or causal.
6 Yet, we all know that many
diseases
7 arise from the complex interplay of the person
and her context, be it social, psychological, physical, eco-
nomic or not (Lalonde 1974; Evans and Stoddart 1990; van
Oers 2002; Arah et al. 2006). My argument is that any
concept of individual health must emphasize the role of the
person’s circumstances in health maintenance or even in
disease causation, ﬂeshing out the imbalance between the
internal and external functionings. This imbalance is
reﬂected in a recent attempt to characterize the origins of
human disease (Mackenbach 2006):
In all its manifestations, human disease is a reaction
of organisms to, and/or a failure to cope with, one or
more unbalancing changes in their internal environ-
ments. These are caused by one or more unfavourable
exchanges with their external environments and/or
failures in the structural and functional design of
organisms. In the ﬁnal analysis, human disease is
attributable to the dependence of organisms on a
fundamentally hostile external environment and to
unfortunate evolutionary legacies.
To be sure, there is more to health than mere absence of
disease. An emphasis on the notion of the context—or what
naturalists call the ‘‘statistically normal environment’’ or
the normativists call ‘‘standard circumstances’’—is needed
to understand how health is promoted in a positive sense,
maintained or disrupted, and to give meaning to the theory
of health as a continuum rather than as a binary concept of
health versus disease. Three important properties charac-
terize the context of health and disease. Firstly, this context
has to be seen in terms of internal–external balance
between the individual and her context or environment.
Secondly, the contextual balance must be causal in nature,
at least in the counterfactual sense of being capable of
leading to a different individual health if the balance were
altered (Lewis 1973; Greenland 2000; Maldonado and
Greenland 2002; Pearl 2000). Hume (1748, p. 115) deﬁnes
a cause to be ‘‘an object, followed by another …where, if
the ﬁrst object had not been, the second had never existed.’’
An important aspect of this view of causation is its coun-
terfactual concept: a certain outcome event (the ‘‘second
object,’’ or effect) would not have occurred if, contrary to
fact, an earlier event (the ‘‘ﬁrst object,’’ or cause) had not
occurred (Maldonado and Greenland 2002; Greenland
2005). Thirdly, context is cumulative. Early life insults can
and have been known to persist into adult life (Kuh and
Ben-Shlomo 2004), and to curb the ability to pursue life’s
vital goals (Nordenfelt 1995) or what one may have reason
to value (Sen 1985, 1992). The foregoing properties re-
deﬁne the context of health as being not merely observed
but actually causative or determinant of the level, dynamics
and distribution of health. This is in line with the popular
use of the phrase ‘‘determinants of health’’ in the health
literature (Arah and Westert 2005).
8 As we will see later
on, the revitalization of the context part of the health
concept allows us to evaluate the health relationship
between individuals and across populations, in essence,
linking individual and population health.
Populations without individuals: from the concept of
health and context of interacting individuals to
population health
Health is a very individual affair. Or is it? When Tolu broke
her leg in a motor accident on a precariously narrow road in
her home town in south-west Nigeria, it seemed fair to say it
was Tolu’s health, not that of her community or any such
6 To my understanding, both the naturalist and normativist deﬁne
probability of health, Pr(H), in terms of ‘‘given the biostatistically
normal environment’’ (Boorse 1997) or ‘‘given standard circum-
stances’’ (Nordenfelt 2007), what I will call the context C: thus, health
probability is, simply put, Pr(H = h|C = c). However, this
Pr(H = h|C = c) is not the same thing as Pr(H = h | do{C = c}),
that is, what health would be if the context were seen as an external
intervention or a causal one inﬂuenced by, say, active change of
environment, lifestyle, interactions, and policies. Thus, C is not
merely observed in the deﬁnition for it to be relevant to health, it must
be causally relevant (hence, the ‘‘do{C = c}’’ calculus). The
probability expression Pr(H = h | do{C = c}) is isomorphic to the
potential outcomes or counterfactual framework of causality envis-
aged by Hume (1748) and Lewis (1973). For instance, allowing
context or ‘‘given standard circumstances’’ to take on a causal–
interventionist meaning is important for appreciating what Tolu’s
health would be if she moved from her deprived circumstances in the
developing Nigeria to the safer afﬂuence of England: Tolu’s context
is thus not only observed but was done by her ‘‘changing’’ her
context. This topic of causality as interventionist even in so-called
observed context versus mere description of observations as a
substitute for causal inference using non-experimental data is the
subject of recently renewed technical and philosophical interests
(Spohn 1980; Pearl 1995, 2000; Greenland 2000; Maldonado and
Greenland 2002; Spirtes et al. 1993).
7 To the determinist, this might well include all diseases.
8 Unfortunately, the term ‘‘determinants of health’’ may leave an
unsavory feeling that the relationship between individual (or even
population) health and its context is rigidly deterministic. Although I
personally see a role for determinism, I temper this to mean no more
than probabilistic determinism, within a counterfactual framework
(Hume 1739, 1748; Lewis 1973; Pearl 2000).
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123collective to which she belonged, that was primarily com-
promised. It turned out that Tolu, who was a publicly
employed physician, in her deprived town with few doctors,
was on her way to the hospital, to respond to an emergency
call from the local hospital to help out on a particularly busy
day. She was supposed to be enjoying her off-duty rest on
that day. Typically, she would attend to a lot of patients,
many of whom suffered from infectious diseases, were
malnourished,andhadbeenvictimsofroadtrafﬁcaccidents,
and so on. Being incapacitated by her injury, she was unable
toattendtoherpatientswhomustnowincreasetheworkload
of other already over-stretched doctors. The infants among
the patients suffered disproportionately; they were more
vulnerable and had illnesses that rapidly consumed them
without prompt care. Unknown to most, the hospital was
unable to save a number of such vulnerable patients who
would have been seen by Tolu had she not been reduced to a
patient herself by a complex web of social and personal
circumstances.Herhealthwasintricatelylinkedtothehealth
ofherfellowtownspeople.Notonlydidtheysufferasaresult
of her inability to be a physician to them, but also they were
subject to what (dangerous roads, deprivation, and other
‘‘standard circumstances’’) shaped Tolu’s health and her
pursuitofhervitalgoals(whichincludedbeingabletocycle,
being an attending physician to the needy, and so on).
Actually, she chose to become a physician as a result of the
telling experiences of growing up in the town’s squalor. So,
theirlives,well-beingandhealth,wereco-dependent,atleast
on some level. In a sense, it was difﬁcult for Tolu to remain
healthy in a town full of so many suffering people. Indeed, it
would be difﬁcult to conclude that this town’s population
health was ideal, full or complete. The interacting individ-
uals who made up the collective were often at risk of less-
than-full health, largely due to the collective ‘‘standard cir-
cumstances’’ they lived in, a context they sculptured or was
sculptured for them in some way, and which also sculptured
who and what they became.
Admittedly, the foregoing illustration is a little drama-
tized. It serves its purpose nonetheless: health is not
entirely individual; it is relative to the individual’s context,
which in turn is fashioned out of the interactions that exist
between members of any deﬁned collective whose health
(read: population health) is deﬁned by the health and
context of its members. The circularity of this concept and
argument is not lost on us. Many diseases such as allergic,
cardiovascular, and even genetic
9 disorders seem to have
contextual antecedents (Mackenbach 2006). And these
contextual causes, determinants or facilitators tend to
accumulate from, probably, before conception and birth
through adult life (Kuh et al. 2003; Kuh and Ben-Shlomo
2004). We will return to this issue of life course and causal
context of health in a population shortly.
First, I want to broach two implicit views of population
health: the simply-the-sum-of-the-parts and the greater-
than-the-sum-of-the-parts views. The former—hopefully
with a dwindling proponents base—sees population health
as no more than a summary of health, aggregated across
individuals within a population (see for instance, the debate
and work on designing summary measures of population:
(World Bank 1993; Murray and Lopez 1994; Murray et al.
1994, 2001, 2002; Murray and Evans 2003; Murray 1994;
Anand and Hanson 1997, 1998; Institute of Medicine 1998;
World Health Organization 2000; Williams 2000; Mathers
et al. 2003, 2004)). Under this view, summary measures of
population health (SMPH) represent aggregated, singular
indices of the quantity and sometimes distribution of health
in a given population. These measures combine data on
mortality and morbidity, including disability, obtained
from the population in question or extrapolated from
‘‘similar contemporary’’ populations. The idea is that both
the quantity and quality of life that an individual born into
such a population could expect to enjoy can be captured by
measures such as healthy life expectancy (HALE) and
disability-adjusted life years (DALY). These measures are
commonly used in global health and national health policy
circles. Critics have pointed that some of these metrics are
not necessarily equitable or particularly suitable for the
health policies they are purported to support:
[Disability-adjusted life years or] DALYs are an
inequitable measure of aggregate ill-health and an
inequitable criterion for resource allocation. Through
age-weighting and discounting, they place a different
value on years lived at different ages and at different
points in time. They value a year saved from illness
more for the able-bodied than the disabled, more for
those in middle age-groups than the young or the
elderly, and more for individuals who are ill today
compared with those who will be ill in the future. We
regard such valuations to be inequitable both for the
9 Take the example of the autosomal recessive hereditary/genetic
condition known as phenylketonuria (PKU), diagnosable in newborns.
It results from a gene mutation on chromosome 12, leading to absent
or reduced activity of the enzyme needed to process one of the
essential amino acids, phenylalanine (present in many cereals, cocoa
products, egg, ﬁsh). Theoretically, if a child with PKU were to be
born in a context where phenylalanine did not exist in staple foods—
Footnote 9 continued
instead a related amino acid, tyrosine, which replaces phenylalanine
in the metabolic pathway in the human body, were present—then it is
difﬁcult for the disorder to be suspected in the absence of mandatory
testing. Therefore, this child could easily grow up without the PKU
disease label. Thanks to the child’s new extraordinary context, she
could remain healthy although her bodily functions are easily engaged
in a process that tends to reduce her health. Notice that her new
context is far from being standard, even relative to her human species.
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123exercises of measuring the quantity of ill-health and
for resource allocation. For resource allocation equity
requires giving priority to the claims of the disad-
vantaged, which cannot be achieved by using the
restricted information set of the DALY (Anand and
Hanson 1998).
The second implicit view of population health, the
greater-than-the-sum-of-the-parts account as pursued in
this article, would see population health as the indivisible
health experience of a collective of individuals, where this
collective is taken to be distinguishable from a mere col-
lection or summation of individuals.
10 The context would
be seen as so deﬁning and powerful that simple aggrega-
tions of health into singular measures would miss the richer
information present in the context that shapes current and
future health of the collective and of its individual mem-
bers. At a minimum, population health should be measured
in multidimensional terms, rich in information for different
purposes and interpretations. Greenland recently under-
scored this requirement as follows:
My intention in raising these issues is not to offer a
solution to a speciﬁc summarization problem. Rather,
it is to remind those facing a choice among measures
that candidates need not (and, for policy purposes,
should not) be limited to unidimensional summaries.
While our ability to think in several dimensions is
limited, it can be improved with practice. That
practice has proven crucial in attacking problems in
physics and engineering, and there is no reason to
suppose it is less important in tackling more complex
social policy issues. In instances in which many dif-
ferent people must make informed choices based on
the same scientiﬁc data, but with different values,
multidimensional measures are essential if we are to
provide each person and each executive body with
sufﬁcient information for rational choice (Greenland
2005).
It is clear that how population health is measured is
dependent on how it is conceptualized. If population health
were seen only as aggregate health of a group, then uni-
dimensional metrics such as HALE and DALYs might
sufﬁce. If, however, population health were conceived as a
deeply contextual and causally charged notion, then met-
rics that went beyond the descriptive and dealt with the
predictive, explanatory and evaluative would be needed
(McDowell et al. 2004). Is this how population health is
conceived in the public health literature? Population health
as a concept of health has been deﬁned as ‘‘the health
outcomes of a group of individuals, including the distri-
bution of such outcomes within the group’’ (Kindig and
Stoddart 2003). Additionally, as a ﬁeld, population health
is said to address how and why some groups of people are
healthy and others are not (McDowell et al. 2004; Evans
and Stoddart 2003). The late Geoffrey Rose once described
the population [health] strategy as
‘‘… the attempt to control the determinants of inci-
dence, to lower the mean level of risk factors, to shift
the whole distribution of exposure in a favourable
direction. In its traditional ‘public health’ form it has
involved mass environmental control methods; in its
modernformitisattempting(lesssuccessfully)toalter
some of society’s norms of behaviour’’ (Rose 1985).
Although the term population health could mean health
outcome or health determinants in relation to public health
outcomes or both, public health specialists mostly spend
their time trying to inﬂuence the determinants or the so-
called root causes of population health. This population
health approach is quite old although there is no deﬁnitive
history of this approach, with recent historic applications
seen in the works of Jerry Morris and Richard Titmuss
(Szreter 2003) and in the seminal Lalonde model (Lalonde
1974; Evans and Stoddart 1990).
At its simplest level, the health determinants or Lalonde
model states that health has four classes of determinants:
lifestyle, environment, human biology, and healthcare.
This rather simple model was rather well-received, with no
one seriously challenging the view that how we lived,
where we lived, who we were (born), and the care we used
all shaped our health. As Evans and Stoddart (1990) noted,
the policy response was not entirely clear given that one
possible policy interpretation could have been that health
was a personal choice. This is something that could be
heard echoing in the corridors of many North American
and European ministries, given the rise of consumerism,
performance disclosure, market mechanisms and the
information age in nearly all public policy areas. If any-
thing, public policy on health missed the point about the
health of populations being contextual, a reﬂection of the
complex interplay of lifestyle, environment, human biol-
ogy and even healthcare. Recently, a global Commission
on Social Determinants of Health was launched by the
World Health Organization to focus health policies on the
social context of health and inequalities (Lee 2005; Mar-
mot 2006; Irwin et al. 2006). I can only hope the renewed
interests will see the context of population health as both a
means and an end, not just another series of inputs
for attaining and subsequently aggregating health across
10 This indivisibility and inseparability of individuals and their
context must be seen in such a way that the same collective of
individuals could not be moved from their current context to a new
one without changing the identity, health, interactions, and well-being
of the collective.
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comprises so much diversity, meaning and information
which must be factored into any health evaluation exercise
or intervention that seeing context as only given circum-
stances is to render the very concept of health of a person
and of a group impotent.
The life course
A crucial prerequisite for deﬁning individual health and
population health in terms of their context is that context
must be dynamic and causal. Dynamic implies that context
is not stationary. Even habitual lifestyles are rarely sta-
tionary; they are subject to the enabling environment and
resources that feed such habits. Human biology is subject
to numerous factors like micro-organisms, radiation, acci-
dents, and so on. Individuals are born; they develop from
childhood, adolescence through adulthood, learning the
language and ways of life of their parents, imbibing their
tastes, experiences, music, dance, art, and interacting with
other people. They fall ill, survive, marry, have their own
children, live with the marks of their experiential journey
through life, and are continuously molded by their context
as they search for and deﬁne who and what they become.
Social epidemiologists only recently discovered this life
course interpretation of the health, well-being and over-all
context of human beings, something that was already
known for many years to psychologists, sociologists,
anthropologists, biologists, and demographers (Kuh and
Ben-Shlomo 2004). Life course
…epidemiology studies long term effects on later
health or disease risk of physical or social exposures
during gestation, childhood, adolescence, young
adulthood and later adult life. It aims to elucidate
biological, behavioural, and psychosocial processes
that operate across an individual’s life course, or
across generations, to inﬂuence the development of
disease risk (Kuh and Ben-Shlomo 2004).
Parents’ social class, behaviors, wealth, education, and
other childhood factors like cognitive and psychosocial
developments have all been shown to determine who stays
healthy, falls ill or dies prematurely in adult life (Kuh and
Ben-Shlomo 2004; Case et al. 2005). If lifetime circum-
stances so evidently mold health and well-being and also
subsequent social and other life circumstances in such
cumulative ways, why must the health of persons and
groups be seen as individual or concerted organ function-
ing given normal environment or circumstances? What is
normal? Which environment? The currently observed one?
Or the one that has accumulated over the life course and
may remain a harbinger of well-being in years to come?
Neither individuals nor collectives can be understood in
only cross-sectional, one-time views. All through their
lifetimes, individuals become the collective just as the
collective becomes them. And collectives age across gen-
erations of its members, evolving and deﬁning and being
deﬁned through cumulative and adaptive experiences,
events, and history. In all these, an individual still retains
her individual, distinctive identities that evolve over time.
This individualism within a collective should not be mis-
taken with the ordinary usage of individualism that seems
to suggest a whiff of unsociability, but should be taken as
the sort that forms the basis for an extensive concern for
others (Appiah 2005). This concern is the type needed
throughout life to build a context worthy of individuality,
freedom and collective well-being and health.
Healthy individuals, healthy populations
So far, I have argued that neither individual nor population
health is easily separable from the other. Even when they
are considered separable, as approaches to health, rather
than health concepts, Geoffrey Rose would seem to choose
the population approach because he was a strong believer
in the context and distribution of health and its causes (not
that he would sacriﬁce individuals to achieve his objec-
tives) (Rose 1985, 1992). One might ask if the link between
individual and population health could then be construed to
imply that unhealthy individuals could not be found in
healthy populations and vice versa. Instances of incon-
gruity between individual and population health may be
best understood by considering a possible categorization of
the individual-versus-population health relationship.
Therefore, borrowing terminology from epidemiologic
methodology (Copas 1973; Greenland and Robins 1986), I
can classify the individual-versus-population health rela-
tionship into four categories:
1. Immune: individual health remains good irrespective
of the population health or context
2. Causative: individual health is boosted in favorable
population health or context
3. Preventive: individual health is compromised when
population health or context is unfavorable
4. Doomed: individual health is compromised irrespec-
tive of the population health or context.
Categories 1 and 4 would be rare under our consider-
ations and in real life. They would include genetic diseases
(category 4) which progress irrespective what is done or
experienced in the collective or medicine. The two middle
categories would be far more realistic and common. A
category 2 illustration: If along with the growing physician
emigration (Arah et al. 2008), Tolu were to move from her
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123impoverished circumstances in Nigeria to a safer suburb
somewhere in England, her health would no longer be what
it was or would have been back in her hometown. She and
her family might not only enjoy the healthful experiences
of their new context, they might also acquire other non-
health experiences and tastes which might subsequently
redeﬁne their immediate and long-term well-being. She,
and in particular her children, would have escaped from a
context where their life expectancies might have been the
odd forty-something years to a place where they could live
well into their seventh decade or longer. This would con-
trast with a category 3 scenario where Jane, a Brit, who
might have lived to be an octogenarian in England, would
end up cutting her life short in her thirties by moving to a
mosquito-infested Nigeria without proper anti-malarial
prophylaxis or by being involved in a rather common road
trafﬁc accident there. Similarly, it is very difﬁcult to
imagine populations that could be called healthy if the
context for health is heavily compromised and individual
members of the collective are at constant risk of dangerous
exposures and events. It then seems to me that the rela-
tionship between individual and population health is a
matter of ubi mel ibi apes—where there is honey there are
bees.
To be sure, health is not entirely relative. It will be self-
defeatist to assume a rigidly relativist view. Such a view
would excuse the unfortunate morbidity and mortality
suffered by millions of children in deprivation in Africa.
After all, their ‘‘fate’’ could be dismissed as their context.
However, this would imply denying a partial absolutist
notion of health (for instance, for these children not to be
malnourished, to enjoy good health, and not be stricken
dead before age ﬁve). In a purely relativist view, we could
easily miss a widespread compromise of health in a context
where health was already poor because we might errone-
ously infer that the relative distribution of health remained
unchanged. The absolutist core of health implies that
whenever health is compromised to the extent that func-
tioning is obstructed that there is ill-health, no matter what
the relative picture looks like. It is on this absolutist core of
health that a relativist layer of the enabling context of
health should be built. The relationship between individual
and population health resides mostly in this relativist layer,
although it requires the absolutist notion of health to exist
in the ﬁrst instance.
Without the informative contextual characterization of
health at the individual or population level, there is little
insight being gained by saying a person or a community is
healthy. A possible criticism here is that this contextual re-
interpretation of individual and population health includes
almost every well-being oriented activity under the rubric
of health. True, but this fear of all-inclusiveness that has
already been leveled against the normativist school is not
embarrassing. If anything, it is refreshingly bold to attempt
to elevate the concept of health to the level of human well-
being. If health is so integral to the notion of well-being
and to the ability to conduct the life one may have reason to
value (including achieving one’s vital goals) (Nussbaum
and Sen 1993; Nordenfelt 1995, 2007), then it is not sur-
prising that the boundaries of health can easily encroach on
the boundaries of well-being and life as a whole. After all,
health represents both functioning (the achieved) and
capability (the achievable): a means to life’s other vital
goals or capabilities as well as an end in itself (Sen 1985;
Nussbaum and Sen 1993).
I suspect that when some philosophers reject such
ambitious notions of health, they are merely concerned
with the overuse or abuse of possible responses or inter-
ventions to deal with not being in ‘‘full health’’: a fear of
medicalization. However, I think such criticisms miss the
subtle but important distinctions between the boundaries of
health (and thus, health need) and the boundaries of
healthcare (and thus, healthcare need).
11 Health need
depicts the shortfall in ideal health (in some sense, a
gradual progression from the completely healthy end of the
health spectrum to the disease end), whereby the shortfall
and context combine to hinder the ability to ﬂourish to a
degree important to the individual. Healthcare need, on the
other hand, alludes to a shortfall in health which inhibits a
person’s ability to ﬂourish and which is only amenable to
healthcare or organized medicine. Not every health need
would become a healthcare need. In this sense, health need
subsumes healthcare need, not the other way around. Suf-
ﬁce it to say that while it is necessary to avoid
medicalization, there is little reason for a concept of health
to be bounded mainly by this medicalization avoidance or
by any narrowly deﬁned interpretation of what medicine is.
Medicine is largely a socially constructed response and
therefore secondary, whereas health is more fundamental
11 From an economic societal perspective, healthcare need has been
deﬁned ‘‘as the minimum amount of resources required to exhaust a
person’s capacity to beneﬁt’’ (Culyer 1995). Culyer proposed the
following conditions for recognizing healthcare need: (i) that its
value-content be up-front and easily interpretable; (ii) that it be
directly derived from the objective(s) of the health care system; (iii)
that it be capable of empirical application in issues of horizontal and
vertical distribution; (iv) that it should be service and person speciﬁc;
(v) that it should enable a straightforward link to be made to
resources; (vi) that it should not, if acted upon as a distributional
principle, produce manifestly inequitable results. Culyer’s deﬁnition
has all the good elements of the capacity to beneﬁt notion, an
observation that should please those who object to ‘‘medicalization’’
on safety and effectiveness grounds. It also quantiﬁes the resources
that are needed, a feature that ought to please those who fear
‘‘medicalization’’ on inefﬁciency grounds. Tolu and Jane, say, might
have equal health needs and yet different healthcare needs, or
different health needs but the same healthcare needs. If at equal health
needs, Tolu required more resource-intensive healthcare, Culyer
would say that Tolu had higher healthcare need than Jane.
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123and therefore prior. Nordenfelt has discussed some of the
notions of medicine as health enhancement in both narrow
and broad senses (Nordenfelt 1998, 2001).
For now, I will submit that the prevailing dichotomi-
zation of medicine—and its associated ﬁelds including
(bio)ethics—into clinical medicine and public health
aspects is erroneous, inefﬁcient, and outdated, if not
unethical. This criticism can also be leveled against the
duality I have been discussing, namely, individual versus
population health. Such binary views which seem to per-
vade almost all of public policy on health fail to use the
rich information and interpretations that stem from a more
comprehensive approach to health over the life course (i) of
the individual within the collective and (ii) of the collective
of interacting individuals.
Many questions remain unanswered. I invite the reader
to consider them: If the concepts of individual versus
population health are so intimately interwoven, why do
bioethicists see the need to separate public health ethics
from main stream bioethics? Is it to give ethical consid-
erations to, say, distributional issues that would otherwise
be difﬁcult at the individual or clinical level? Or are we
young public health ethicists just busy building a parallel
dichotomy similar to that seen between clinical medicine
and public health, by way of argumentum ad verecundiam?
Further, given the mounting evidence that health is com-
promised early in life and that the insults are borne forward
into adult life and beyond and ultimately lead to expensive
healthcare, why do health policies still concentrate over-
whelmingly on healthcare in adulthood? While we are at it,
must healthcare represent the standard policy response to
health problems, in effect being what Norman Daniels once
called the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff after the free
fall through life?
Conclusions
This article has argued that the relationship between indi-
vidual and population health is one that is entrenched in the
contextual deﬁnition of health and its life course causes. I
have made an attempt to derive this relationship based on
the concept of health (if we were to continue pursuing such
a concept anyway) by including a population perspective on
health. I emphasized the role of the ‘‘context’’ component of
any notion of health, that is, the role of the ‘‘standard
circumstances’’ or the so-called ‘‘statistically normal envi-
ronment.’’ I then argued that this context is both individual
and collective in nature, in largely inseparable ways, and
that context must be causally seen across the life of an
individual and the life of the collective. The meanings of
both individual and population health lie in this revitalized
life course and causally deﬁned context, and have
implications for how we measure and analyze health at all
levels.Armedwith the reasoned scrutiny and the unresolved
complexity of the concepts, I invite philosophers and other
scientists to revisit the deﬁnitions of individual health and
population health ifthe notions are to carry any more weight
in ongoing discourses in public health, healthcare, and
bioethics. I can only hope that this article will stimulate
furtherdebates onindividualandpopulationhealthconcepts
and on their associated policy-relevant ﬁelds. One conclu-
sion of this article, for now, is that health, be it individual or
population health, can be very context-dependent. After all,
prior to the accident,Tolu may have been absolutely healthy
fromherpersonalexperientialpointofview,butshewasstill
contextually unhealthy, relatively speaking.
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